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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A heterogeneous sales force may not be as desirable as a homogeneous sales 
force for two reasons: premiums are required for all except from one agent type, and 
only the highest type would work as hard as though they were from a homogeneous 
sales force. This study revisits the heterogeneous sales force compensation and price 
delegation problem with type-dependent reservation. We find that an equilibrium 
separating or pooling compensation contract always exists. Different types of agents 
may receive premiums, and there are scenarios when no premiums are paid. Retaining 
centralized pricing provides a tool for regulating agent behavior. More than one or 
even all agent types may work as hard as though they were members of a 
homogeneous sales force. These findings differ from existing results and their driving 
force is the dynamics between the differences in reservations and agents’ effort costs 
arising from concealing their true types. 
 
Keywords: heterogeneous sales force, compensation, price delegation, sales quota, 
reservation utility 
 
1 Introduction
For a firm that employs a sales force to sell its products, a central problem is the alignment of its sales
force incentive scheme with the objectives of the sales agents. Not surprisingly, sales force compensation
problems have been accorded considerable attention, as indicated in the comprehensive reviews by
Coughlan and Sen (1989), Coughlan (1993), Albers (2008), as well as Mantrala et al. (2010).
Sales agents mainly work independently. Their sales efforts are usually unobservable by manage-
ment. An effective compensation scheme is thus often directly related to the sales outcome of each
agent. Basu et al. (1985) showed that a non-linear compensation plan with a fixed base salary and a
sales-dependent commission is optimal for a homogenous sales force under symmetric information. The
salary depends on the available information, such as selling abilities. However, sales forces are usually
heterogeneous. Although firms may know the differences in ability among their agents, they often do
not initially know the exact ability of an individual agent. This information asymmetry between a
firm and its agents renders the plan of Basu et al. (1985) ineffective. This difficulty presented by
asymmetric information can be overcome by designing a compensation scheme with a menu of sales
quotas (Rao 1990, Raju and Srinivasan 1996, and Albers 1996). With this scheme, an agent freely
chooses the quota that best suits him and, in the process, reveals his true type/ability to the firm (Rao
1990).
In summarizing his findings on the optimal menu-based compensation contract, Rao (1990) observed
that in a heterogeneous sales force: all but the agent with the lowest ability receive compensation that
exceeds their reservation utility (i.e., receive a premium or information rent); and all but the agent
with the highest ability expend efforts at lower levels than they would if they were members of a
homogeneous sales force. The first observation is a standard result in contract theory that is applied
between an uninformed principal and an agent of unknown type but whose reservation is independent
of the type. However, reservation can be type-dependent for a number of reasons, such as competing
principals in the market, different fixed trading/opportunity costs, and renegotiation (Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991, Jullien 2000). When agent reservations are type dependent, the rationality condition has
been noted to possibly bind (no information rent) at the highest type, some middle type, or for some
interior range rather than at the lowest type (Lewis and Shappington 1989a, 1989b, Champsaur and
Rochet 1989, Laffont and Tirole 1990a, 1990b). Lewis and Shappington (1989b) presented a suitable
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example of type-dependent reservation and its impact. A type-dependent fixed cost was introduced to
the standard principal-agent problem studied by Baron and Myerson (1982). This fixed cost can be
interpreted either as a technology-dependent fixed production cost or as a type-dependent opportunity
cost. The change of the fixed cost from type-independent to type-dependent produces a major impact on
the optimal contract design, that is, the rationality condition is binding at a certain type of realization
in the middle rather than at the lower end. A type-realization interval was likewise observed, in which
only pooling equilibrium and no separating equilibrium exists. Clearly, type-dependent reservation is
an important feature of principal-agent problems and has been studied from different perspectives in
the economics literature. However, how type-dependent reservation affects sales force compensation
scheme has not been studied in marketing literature.
When relying on agents to sell products, a firm also needs to decide whether to delegate or to
centralize the pricing decision. Although management may prefer to retain the pricing decision, agents
with a better knowledge of the market environment may be at a better position to determine prices.
Mishra and Prasad (2004) found that when the private information known by agents can be revealed
through contracting, centralized pricing performs as least as well as price delegation. However, when the
pricing issue is considered jointly with the compensation scheme design for agents with type-dependent
reservations, will centralized pricing still be preferred?
In this paper, we examine the effect of type-dependent reservation on the compensation scheme for
a heterogeneous sales force and the pricing strategy of the firm. A number of questions may be asked.
Is it necessary for a firm to pay information rents to all but the lowest type of agents to determine their
true types? Is it possible to design a mechanism that pays information rents to fewer types or pays no
information rent to any type, and still reveal the true types of all agents? Is it still true that only agents
of the highest type expend the best effort as if they were members of a homogenous sales force when
reservation is type-dependent? Furthermore, with type-dependent reservation, can the firm still design
type-specific contracts that induce agents to reveal their true types? We likewise intend to know how
pricing strategy and compensation contract design interact with each other and whether pricing can
be used to regulate agents’ behavior. Finally, Rao’s observations imply that for a firm a homogeneous
sales force works better than a heterogenous sales force. Is this always true when the heterogenous sales
force has type-dependent reservation? Can we identify specific conditions under which a well managed
heterogeneous sales force works at least as well as or even better than a homogeneous sales force?
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We focus on a sales force with two types of agents. A sales force may have many agents, who belong
to a high-type with a higher ability and a higher reservation, or to a low-type with a lower ability
and a lower reservation. We later show that the main results hold for problems with many different
agent types. We identify the conditions under which the equilibrium compensation contract exists
under different pricing schemes with type-dependent reservations and then completely characterize
the equilibrium contracts. We found that at least one agent type would not receive information rent,
which could be the low type, the high type, or any type (when there are many types), depending
on the magnitude of the difference between the reservations and its comparison with the effort cost
difference when the agent would not report his true type. This finding differs from the results in
the above economics literature, where for different problems, the rationality condition is binding at a
different type rather than the lowest type. We also show that it is possible for the firm to design a
compensation mechanism that could reveal the true types of all agents without paying any information
rents. Furthermore, rather than only agents with the highest ability, different types of agents may
work as hard (and even harder) as though they were members of a homogeneous sales force; and
under certain conditions, all types of agents may work as hard as if they comprise a homogenous sales
force. Meanwhile, under equilibrium, the firm may not always be able to design type-specific contracts,
and hence cannot always identify the type of each agent. We find that pricing adds a dimension in
contract design for regulating agents’ behavior. Finally, comparing centralized pricing with delegated
pricing with type-dependent reservations, we found that delegated pricing is preferred by the firm when
centralized equilibrium separating contracts do not exist.
Basu et al. (1985) presented one of the first works on sales force compensation problems. The au-
thors considered a homogenous and risk-averse sales force with the moral hazard and found a nonlinear
optimal compensation plan. Lal and Staelin (1986) found that the nonlinear compensation contract
proposed by Basu et al. (1985) is not always optimal when the sales force is heterogenous with infor-
mation asymmetry. The conditions under which a menu of compensation plans of Basu et al. (1985)
can be optimal for a heterogenous sales force were shown. Lal and Srinivasan (1993) discussed linear
compensation plans for single and multi-product sales forces. With ex-ante symmetric information,
they showed by comparative statics that improvements in alternative job opportunities would increase
the salary but would not affect the commission rate, which determines the sales effort. By contrast,
in our model type-dependent reservations would not only affect the agent payments, but also their
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effort decisions. Rao (1990) proposed a menu of quota-based compensation plans for a heterogeneous
sales force with private information and showed that only the lowest type receives no information rent,
whereas only the highest type makes the first best effort. Raju and Srinivasan (1996) showed that in
specific scenarios, the performance of quota-based contracts can be very close to that of the optimal
plan of Basu et al. (1985). Park (1995) and Kim (1997) demonstrated that a bonus for meeting the
quota may lead to the first-best effort by agents with binding participation constraints in a moral
hazard problem. Under a similar setting, Oyer (2000) demonstrated that a quota-based plan may lead
to the first best effort for agent types with non-binding participation constraints. Our results show
that with quota-based plans, both agents with binding and non-binding participation constraints may
make the first best sales effort. Kala and Shi (2001) and Murthy and Mantrala (2005) studied the
use of sales contests as a relative performance-based incentive scheme. Rather than focusing on the
analysis of optimal contract form, we adopt quota-based contracts under centralized pricing and linear
contracts under delegating pricing for a heterogeneous sales force with asymmetric information. These
contract forms in our setting are both optimal. Our work differs from those of the above studies in
that we design the optimal compensation structure for heterogeneous sales force with type-dependent
reservations. Our results show that the optimal contract structure depends on different reservations.
A number of authors considered variations of sales force compensation problems. Mantrala et al.
(1994) considered the compensation of a heterogeneous sales force that sells multiple products. Zhang
and Mahajan (1995) analyzed the compensation schemes for a heterogeneous sales force with two
complementary or substitutable products. Joseph and Thevaranjan (1998) examined the roles of both
sales agent monitoring and incentive in a compensation scheme. Misra et al. (2005) considered the
risk attitudes of agents in heterogeneous sales force compensation. Caldieraro and Coughlan (2007)
analyzed the use of spiffs in a three-level marketing system with manufacturers, represent firms and
salespeople. The spiffs are incentives given directly to sales agents by the manufacturer. Caldieraro
and Coughlan (2009) demonstrated how the interaction between territory allocation and sales force
compensation affects the profit of the firm. Chen (2000, 2005) studied sales force incentive problems
together with inventory decision. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2009) compared franchise fee and retail price
maintenance contracts where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent with private information to sell the
product. They found that the level of equilibrium effort and sales of both contract forms are lower than
the first best, and all agents except the lowest type would receive a positive information rent. Chu and
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Lai (2013) examined sales force contracting when excess demand results in lost sales and the demand
information is censored by the inventory level. They found that quota-based contract is optimal and
demand censorship can induce the first-best solution under certain conditions when no adverse selection
exists. When agents have private information on the market, the firm has to pay information rent to
agents of high type. However, we found that the firm may not need to pay information rent to the
high-type agent and the low types may likewise obtain information rent.
Our research is also related to the price delegation problem: Should price decisions be made by the
firm or delegated to the sales force? This question appears to have no unconditional answer. Lal (1986)
showed that price delegation is appropriate when the salesperson possesses relevant private information
that is not available to the firm. Meanwhile, Mishra and Prasad (2004) found that centralized pricing
reaches the upper bound on the firm’s expected profit if the salesperson signs the contract with the firm
after the private information is revealed to him. Bhardwaj (2001) as well as Mishra and Prasad (2005)
examined the delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets. In our study, the setting for our price
delegation problem is the same as that of Mishra and Prasad (2004). However, we combine the firm’s
compensation contract design with pricing decisions under type-related reservations. The finding shows
that the firm’s delegation decision depends on the difference of reservations and centralized pricing is
not always preferred.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we separately define the models for
centralized and delegating pricing. In section 3, we show that with different reservation profits, a key
property of Rao’s model cannot be preserved in both models and subsequently present the optimal
contract menus for two models. In section 4, we extend the results from section 3 to N agent types.
We conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Model
A firm employs a heterogeneous sales force to sell a single product. The manager (she) of the firm needs
to design a set of compensation contracts for the sales agents (agents). Her objective is to maximize
the profit generated from each agent, agent (he), who selects a contract to maximize his own profit by
exerting an appropriate level of sales effort. The abilities (types) of individual agents are unknown to
the manager. However, she knows the proportions (distribution) of different agent types in the sales
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force and can estimate different market responses generated by different types of agents. The manager
cannot observe the sales efforts of agents. With this lack of observability, the compensation scheme
must be based on the realized sales. She therefore encounters a mixture of moral hazard (that she
cannot observe the sales efforts) and adverse selection (that the agent possesses superior information
of his own ability). By observing the contract chosen by an agent, the manager also wishes to learn his
type. Furthermore, she needs to consider whether to centraly set the price of the product or delegate
the pricing decision to the agent. Thus, under centralized pricing, a contract includes the product price
whereas under delegated pricing, the agent sets the price of the product.
In this sales agent compensation problem, the sequence of events is as follows: (1) the manager offers
a menu of contracts to a sales agent (prices are included in the contracts under centralized pricing); (2)
the agent decides whether and which contract to sign; (3) the agent makes an effort decision (and sets
the price if he is delegated to do so), and proceeds with the sales; and then (4) both parties observe the
realized sales, and the firm pays the sales agent according to the contract. This sequence is standard
for compensation problems with asymmetric information and is commonly assumed in literature (e.g.,
Lal 1986, Rao 1990, and Misra and Prasad 2004).
We assume that the realized sales s of the agent is a linear function of the price p, his type (ability)
θ, and his effort e,
s = s0 + θe− bp, (1)
where s0 (s0 > 0) is the market potential and b (b > 0) represents the price elasticity. Besides its
tractability, a linear response function is reasonable for many market situations and is commonly used
in the sales force compensation literature, such as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Bhardwaj
(2001).
For clarity of result, we first restrict the number of agent types to two: high type and low type,
with abilities θH and θL, respectively, where θH > θL. We use H and L as subscripts to indicate high
and low types, respectively. The sales force could have many individual agents, but they all belong to
one of the two types, and the proportions ρ and 1− ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1) of high type and low type agents
in the job market are common knowledge.
The sales efforts of the agent can include a number of factors, such as time and money (including
discount off the firm’s price that he offers to the customer in centralized pricing). For modeling
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convenience, we assume that the total effort represents a cost to the agent and denote it by V (e) for
effort level e. We assume as in the marketing literature that V (e) is increasing in e at an increasing
rate (e.g., Rees 1985). Specifically, we assume the following convex effort cost function,
V (e) = e2/2. (2)
Let {(qH , tH , pH), (qL, tL, pL)} be the compensation menu under centralized pricing, where qH and
qL are sales quotas, tH and tL are the compensations, and pH and pL are the product prices for high-
and low-type agents.
Let Ri be the agent’s reservation profit, x be his choice of compensation scheme, and eix be his
effort for his selected compensation contract, i as well as x = H or L. Here, RH ≥ RL. His profit/reward
pii(e, x) satisfies
pii(e, x) = tx − V (eix) ≥ Ri, i, x = H or L. (3)
We assume that different reservations are estimated according to the prevailing industry standard and
are common knowledge.
Normalizing the unit product cost to 0 (one can think of that the unit price has already netted the
cost), the profit function of the firm under the compensation menu is then
pif (qH , tH , pH , qL, tL, pL) = ρ(pH × qH − tH) + (1− ρ)(pL × qL − tL). (4)
For the quota scheme defined above, the agent is paid a fixed amount if the quota is reached and
nothing if the quota is missed. With a deterministic response function, the quota selected by the agent
could be precisely achieved. For the firm, this quota form is equivalent to a linear contract with a fixed
salary and a commission for each unit of sales as long as the response functions remains the same as
(1). This allows us to directly compare our results with those in Rao (1990).
Incorporating the compensation scheme and considering the agent reservation, the original game
problem of (3) and (4) under centralized pricing becomes the following principal-agent problem:
Pc : max
pH ,qH ,tH ,pL,qL,tL
{ρ(pH × qH − tH) + (1− ρ)(pL × qL − tL)}
7
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s.t.
(I) tH − V (eHH) ≥ RH
(II) tL − V (eLL) ≥ RL
(III) tH − V (eHH) ≥ tL − V (eHL)
(IV ) tL − V (eLL) ≥ tH − V (eLH)
(V ) eix = argmax tx − V (eix), i, x = H or L
. (5)
In Pc, (I) and (II) are individual rationality (IR) constraints; whereas (III), (IV) and (V) are
incentive compatibility (IC) constraints to ensure that the agent would select the contract designed for
his type and hence reveal his true type to the firm. These constraints are standard for contract design
(see, for example, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
Under delegated pricing, the compensation depends on the price set by the agent. We use the form
ti = αi + (pi − yi) ∗ qi, where αi is the firm’s margin, and pi is the product price (i = H,L). The
commission rate under this compensation form is (pi − yi)/(pi) (Bhardwaj 2001). Under this scheme,
the set of contracts offered by the firm is {(αH , yH), (αL, yL)}. The agent would choose a contract and
decide on the optimal effort and price to maximize his profit. The resulting principal-agent problem
under price delegation is then:
Pd : max
yH ,αH ,yL,αL
ρ(yH × qHH − αH) + (1− ρ)(yL × qLL − αL)
s.t.
(I) αH + (pHH − yH)qHH − V (eHH) ≥ RH
(II) αL + (pLL − yL)qLL − V (eLL) ≥ RL
(III) αH + (pHH − yH)qHH − V (eHH) ≥ αL + (pHL − yL)qHL − V (eHL)
(IV ) αL + (pLL − yL)qLL − V (eLL) ≥ αH + (pLH − yH)qLH − V (eLH)
(V ) pix, eix = argmax αx + (pix − yx)qix − V (eix) i, x = H or L, yi ≥ 0
. (6)
In Pd, (I) and (II) are IR constraints, whereas (III), (IV) and (V) are IC constraints. Constraint
(V) can be used to predict the actions of the agent.
3 Optimal Contracts
In this section, we derive the equilibrium separating contracts under centralized pricing and delegated
pricing, respectively. The equilibrium separating contract does not always exist, and thus we also
examine the equilibrium pooling contracts. Comparing separating and pooling contracts, we establish
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a strategy for the manager to offer either a set of separating contracts or a pooling contract under
different agent type realizations. Similarly, we also compare the performance of the optimal contracts
under centralized and delegated pricing to determine the choice of pricing scheme.
3.1 Centralized Pricing
Let r = θH/θL. Clearly, r > 1 and measures the relative ability gap (or type difference) of the low type
from the high type. To facilitate the presentation of the optimal decisions, we define
ψ1 = 1−ρ1−ρ/r2
Vc1 = 12(1− r−2)
(
s0ψ1θL
2b−ψ1θ2L
)2
Vc2 = 12(1− r−2)
(
s0θL
2b−θ2L
)2
Vc3 = 12(r
2 − 1)
(
s0θH
2b−θ2H
)2
. (7)
It is easy to show that 0 < ψ1 < 1 and Vc1 < Vc2 < Vc3. Below, these V values are shown to form three
distinct thresholds. When r2 < 1/(1− ρ), we have a forth threshold Vc4 > Vc3 defined by
Vc4 =
1
2
(r2 − 1)
(
s0ψ2θH
2b− ψ2θ2H
)2
, (8)
where ψ2 = ρ1−(1−ρ)r2 > 1.
We assume that 2b > θ2H to ensure a positive price in a centralized system with symmetric infor-
mation. For any RH , we further assume that s0 is sufficiently large to ensure a non-negative profit for
the firm1. This assumption is commonly made in literature (Laffont and Tirole 1987).
We use ∆R = RH −RL (∆R ≥ 0) to denote the reservation difference of the two agent types, and
define Condition C below, noting that when C holds, then Vc4 > Vc3.
Condition C: r2 < 11−ρ(1−
ρθ2H
2b ).
Proposition 1. A unique equilibrium separating contract exists for each agent type when 0 ≤ ∆R ≤
Vc1 and Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3, as well as when ∆R ≥ Vc4 and C holds. When Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2 and
Vc3 < ∆R < Vc4, as well as when ∆R ≥ Vc4 but C does not hold, no equilibrium separating contract
exists.
The optimal decisions under the equilibrium separating contact are given in Table 1.
1In a centralized system, the firm only needs to decide the optimal price and effort to maximize p(s0+θHe− bp)−e2/2
for a type H agent. The optimal price and effort are p = s0/(2b− θ2H) and e = (s0θH)/(2b− θ2H), respectively. Obviously,
to guarantee a non-negative price, we must have 2b > θ2H . With the optimal price and effort, the maximum social welfare
in centralized system is s20/[2(2b− θ2H)], and the profit of the firm is s20/[2(2b− θ2H)]−RH .
9
HKIBS/WPS/069-1314
Table 1: Optimal decisions under equilibrium separating contracts with centralized pricing
Decisions 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1 Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3 ∆R ≥ Vc4 (if C holds)
p∗H
s0
2b−θ2H
s0
2b−θ2H
s0
2b−ψ2θ2H
p∗L
s0
2b−ψ1θ2L
s0
2b−θ2L
s0
2b−θ2L
q∗H
bs0
2b−θ2H
bs0
2b−θ2H
bs0
2b−ψ2θ2H
q∗L
bs0
2b−ψ1θ2L
bs0
2b−θ2L
bs0
2b−θ2L
t∗H RL +
s20θ
2
H
2(2b−θ2H)2
+ Vc1 RH +
s20θ
2
H
2(2b−θ2H)2
RH +
s20ψ
2
2θ
2
H
2(2b−ψ2θ2H)2
t∗L RL +
s20ψ
2
1θ
2
L
2(2b−ψ1θ2L)2
RL +
s20θ
2
L
2(2b−θ2L)2
RH +
s20θ
2
L
2(2b−θ2L)2
− Vc4
e∗HH
s0θH
2b−θ2H
s0θH
2b−θ2H
s0ψ2θH
2b−ψ2θ2H
e∗LL
s0ψ1θL
2b−ψ1θ2L
s0θL
2b−θ2L
s0θL
2b−θ2L
r > 1 and 2b > θ2H , and thus
1
1−ρ(1−
ρθ2H
2b ) <
1
1−ρ . For
1
1−ρ(1−
ρθ2H
2b ) < r <
1
1−ρ , Vc4 defined in (8)
remains greater than Vc3. We can find a separating contract for the high type. However, the optimal
quota and price in this contract are negative. Thus, the firm has no equilibrium separating contract in
the region ∆R ≥ Vc4 when condition C does not hold.
The standard contract theory can usually demonstrate that an equilibrium separating contract
always exists and performs better than the corresponding pooling contract for the principle, given
that different types of agents have the same reservation (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). When the
reservation is type-dependent, we find that for certain ∆R, there is no separating equilibrium contract.
In other words, the firm would not always be able to design type-specific contracts for agents with type-
dependent reservations, and hence cannot always identify the the agent type. We should then examine
the pooling contract {q, t, p}. The manager needs to solve the following principal-agent problem:
Pcp : max
p,q,t
{p× q − t}
s.t.
(I) t− V (eH) ≥ RH
(II) t− V (eL) ≥ RL
(III) ei = q+bp−s0θi , i = H or L
. (9)
Constraints (I) and (II) are the two IRs. Solving problem Pcp, we arrive at the following proposition.
10
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Table 2: Optimal decisions under equilibrium pooling contract with centralized pricing
Decisions 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc2 ∆R ≥ Vc3
p∗ s0
2b−θ2L
s0
2b−θ2H
q∗ bs0
2b−θ2L
bs0
2b−θ2H
t∗ RL +
s20θ
2
L
2(2b−θ2L)2
RH +
s20θ
2
H
2(2b−θ2H)2
e∗H
θL
θH
s0θL
2b−θ2L
s0θH
2b−θ2H
e∗L
s0θL
2b−θ2L
θH
θL
s0θH
2b−θ2H
Proposition 2. A unique equilibrium pooling contract exists for any ∆R value, except for Vc2 < ∆R <
Vc3 wherein no pooling equilibrium exists.
The optimal decisions of the manager and the agents under the equilibrium contract are given in
Table 2.
We note (from the proof of Proposition 2) that for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc2, the IR constraint for the low
type is binding under the equilibrium. This shows that the quota in the pooling contract can be seen
as designed for the low type, and thus, the high type will obtain an information rent for accepting the
quota. The opposite is true when ∆R ≥ Vc3.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the difference of the two reservations affects both the separating
equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium. Importantly, when an equilibrium separating contract does
not exist for a certain range of ∆R, then an equilibrium pooling contract always exists. As such, an
optimal equilibrium contract strategy exists, which the firm can follow.
Proposition 3. The optimal equilibrium contract strategy for the manager with centralized pricing
changes with the difference of the two reservations, and is given in Table 3.
We note that for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1 and for ∆R ≥ Vc4 when Condition C holds, both equilibrium
separating contract and equilibrium pooling contract exist. As in the standard contract theory, we
can show that when the agent has a type-dependent reservation, the performance of the firm is better
under the separating contract than under the pooling contract.
Let Pi(qx) = pii(e, x) − Ri be the premium accrued to type i agent when he chooses contract
{qx, tx, px}, i, x = H, L. Table 3 shows how the premiums for the two agent types change with the
reservation difference under centralized pricing.
11
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Table 3: Contract strategy, premiums, and efforts compared with those of a homogeneous sales force
Region 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1 Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2 Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3 If C holds Otherwise
Vc3 < ∆R < Vc4 ∆R ≥ Vc4 ∆R > Vc3
Contract Separating Pooling Separating Pooling Separating Pooling
PH(qH) Vc1 −∆R Vc2 −∆R 0 0 0 0
PL(qL) 0 0 0 ∆R− Vc3 ∆R− Vc4 ∆R− Vc3
eH same lower same same higher same
eL lower same same higher same higher
Rao (1990) found that only the least skilled agent receives a zero premium in the optimal contract.
According to Table 3, this conclusion no longer holds when the reservation is type dependent. Below,
we explain how the interaction between the reservation and the cost differences causes the change. We
first state the following observation.
Observation 1 Under the separating equilibrium with θH > θL, q∗H > q
∗
L, the cost difference for a
low-type agent to achieve a high-type quota is always greater than the cost difference for a high-type
agent to achieve a low-type quota.
We also note that by definition: Vc1 and Vc2 are the differences between the costs of meeting the
low-type sales quotas by the low-type and the high-type agents (noting that the effort cost of the
low-type is higher); whereas Vc3 and Vc4 are the differences between the costs of meeting the high-type
sales quotas by the low-type and high-type agents (again, the effort cost of the low-type is higher).
Thus, we may consider the V function as the cost difference.
Consider 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1. Suppose that no information rent is stipulated in the high-type contract.
A high-type agent receives e∗2HH/2 + RH if he accepts the high-type contract. The net gain is exactly
RH . If he selects the low-type contract instead, he receives e∗2LL/2+RL = e
∗2
HL/2+Vc1+RH −∆R, and
his net gain is at least RH . Thus, an information rent of Vc1−∆R is necessary to encourage a high-type
agent to select the high-type contract and reveal his type. Now, suppose that a low-type agent selects
the high-type contract with information rent. He receives e∗2HH/2+RH+Vc1−∆R = e∗2HH/2+RL+Vc1.
His net gain is RL + Vc1 − (e∗2LH − e∗2HH)/2, which is smaller than RL as indicated in Observation 1.
12
HKIBS/WPS/069-1314
Thus, a low-type agent would accept the low-type contract without information rent. The analysis
above leads exactly to the conclusion predicted in Table 3.
When Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2, the firm offers a pooling contract. The pooling contract is essentially for
the low-type agent; a premium is offered to the high type agent to encourage his acceptance.
When Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3, separating equilibrium contracts exist and are offered. Suppose that a high-
type agent chooses the low-type contract and a low-type agent chooses the high-type contract. The net
gains without information rent for the high-type and low-type agents would be e∗2LL/2− e∗2HL/2+RL =
Vc2 + RH −∆R ≤ RH and e∗2HH/2 − e∗2LH/2 + RH = RL + ∆R − Vc3 ≤ RL, respectively. Thus, both
types of agents accept the appropriate contract without information rent.
When Vc3 < ∆R < Vc4 and C holds, the firm offers a pooling contract. The pooling contract
is essentially for the high-type agent; a premium is offered to the low-type agent to encourage his
acceptance.
When Vc4 ≤ ∆R and C holds, separating equilibrium contracts exist and are offered. The net gain
without information rent for a low-type agent to choose the high-type contract would be e∗2HH/2 −
e∗2LH/2+RH = RL−Vc4+∆R ≥ RL. Thus, the low-type agent needs an information rent ∆R−Vc4 to
select the appropriate contract. The net gain for a high-type agent to choose a low-type contract with
information rent would be e∗2LL/2−e∗2HL/2+RL+∆R−Vc4 = e∗2LL/2−e∗2HL/2−Vc4+RH < RH according
to Observation 1. Thus, a high-type agent accepts the appropriate contract without information rent.
Finally, when ∆R > Vc3 and C does not hold, the firm offers a pooling contract. The pooling
contract is essentially for the high-type agent; a premium is offered to the low-type agent to encourage
his acceptance.
Now, we examine how the effort exerted by an agent from a heterogeneous sales force differs from
that of an agent from a homogeneous sales force. Noting that the optimal sales effort of an agent in a
homogeneous sales force is s0θi/(2b− θ2i ), the comparison is likewise given in Table 3.
Rao (1990) demonstrated that all but the agent with the highest skill expend efforts lower than
what they normally would if they were members of a homogeneous sales force. This conclusion no
longer holds when the reservation is type-dependent. For our model, except for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1 when
the low-type agent exerts an effort level lower than s0θL/(2b− θ2L) and for Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2 when the
high-type agent exerts an effort level lower than s0θH/(2b−θ2H), both agent types exert efforts at levels
at least as high as though they were from a homogeneous sales force.
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Thus far, our results for the case with two agent types show that Rao’s two main observations are
no longer true when the reservation is type-dependent. We now discuss another result that differs from
those of the principal-agent literature with type-dependent reservation.
Observation 2 With the change of the reservation difference ∆R, there is at least one interval in
which pooling equilibrium contract exists but no separating equilibrium contract exists.
Lewis and Sappington (1989) found that the IR constraint is binding for only one realization
of the type and at most one non-degenerated pooling interval exists when the agent reservation is an
increasing function of the type. Our results show that at least one IR constraint is binding (Proposition
3, two IRs are binding when Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3) and at least one ∆R interval only has pooling contract
available (Table 3). A key difference between our model and that of Lewis and Sappington (1989)
is that while a single dependence relation exists between the type and reservation in their model,
we only require a higher reservation for a higher type without a fixed relationship between type and
reservation. In addition, the equilibrium in our model depends on the difference of reservations instead
of the reservation directly as in Lewis and Sappington (1989).
Similarly interesting to examine is how the optimal price changes with ∆R as well as how the
optimal quota and the optimal effort relate to the optimal price. From Table 1, we observe that the
optimal price only jumps to a higher level when ∆R passes through threshold Vc1 for the low type and
threshold Vc4 for the high type. A similar jump can be observed from Table 2 for pooling contracts.
For separating contracts, we can also observe that the optimal price for the high type is always strictly
higher that that for the low type. Clearly, the optimal quota can always be written as bp∗i for i = H,L.
The optimal effort is also proportional to the optimal price. For both low and high types, when the
optimal price jumps to a higher level, the optimal effort jumps to a higher proportion of the price.
Observation 3When the pricing decision is kept centralized, the firm can use pricing to regulate sales
quota and effort. Specifically, when ∆R is sufficiently large (no smaller than Vc2), the firm sets a higher
price and higher quota as well as motivates the first best or even higher effort from the heterogenous
sales force.
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Table 4: Equilibrium decisions under delegated pricing for separating contracts
Decisions 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vd1 ∆R ≥ Vd2
y∗H 0 0
y∗L
s0ρ(θ2H−θ2L)
b[2b(1−ρ)−(1−2ρ)θ2H−ρθ2L]
0
α∗H RL − s
2
0
2(2b−θ2H)
+ Vd1 RH − s
2
0
2(2b−θ2H)
α∗L RL − (s0−by
∗
L)
2
2(2b−θ2L)
RH − s
2
0
2(2b−θ2H)
p∗HH
s0
2b−θ2H
s0
2b−θ2H
p∗LL y
∗
L +
s0−by∗L
2b−θ2L
s0
2b−θ2L
e∗HH
s0θH
2b−θ2H
s0θH
2b−θ2H
e∗LL
(s0−by∗L)θL
2b−θ2L
s0θL
2b−θ2L
3.2 Delegated Pricing
We define the following parameters:
Vd1 =
s20(θ
2
H−θ2L)(2b−θ2H)
2(2b−θ2L)[2b−θ2H+ρ(θ2H−θ2L)/(1−ρ)]2
Vd2 =
s20(θ
2
H−θ2L)
2(2b−θ2H)(2b−θ2L)
, (10)
where Vd1 < Vd2. For problem Pd under delegated pricing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Except for Vd1 < ∆R < Vd2 in which no equilibrium separating contract exists, a
unique equilibrium separating contract exists under delegated pricing, and the corresponding optimal
decisions are given in Table 4.
We note from Table 4 that the per unit revenue the firm collected from an agent may be zero, that
is, y∗H = 0 for any ∆R and y
∗
L = 0 for ∆R ≥ Vd2. On the other hand, when y∗i = 0, we can show that
the corresponding α∗i < 0. In other words, the equilibrium separating contract under price delegation
may require the agent to initially purchase a fixed quantity and then sell on his own in the market.
This type of contract is not uncommon in practice. The interesting phenomenon is that the firm may
only offer the buy-out contract to the high-type agent while offering the low-type agent the regular
contract. Furthermore, if the buy-out contract is offered to both agent types (i.e., when ∆R ≥ Vd2),
the buy-out payments for the two agent types are identical. In other words, the buy-out contract in
this case is essentially a pooling contract.
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Table 5: Equilibrium decisions under delegated pricing with pooling contracts
Decisions 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vdp ∆R ≥ Vd2
y∗ s0ρ(θ
2
H−θ2L)
b[2b−(1−2ρ)θ2H−2ρθ2L]
0
α∗ RL − (s0−by
∗)2
2(2b−θ2L)
RH − s
2
0
2(2b−θ2H)
p∗H y
∗ + s0−by
∗
2b−θ2H
s0
2b−θ2H
p∗L y
∗ + s0−by
∗
2b−θ2L
s0
2b−θ2L
e∗H
(s0−by∗)θH
2b−θ2H
s0θH
2b−θ2H
e∗L
(s0−by∗)θL
2b−θ2L
s0θL
2b−θ2L
Again, some ∆R intervals may have no separating equilibrium contract, and we need to consider
pooling contracts. To design a pooling contract, the manager solves the following problem under
delegated pricing.
Pdp : max
y,α
{ρ(y × qH − α) + (1− ρ)(y × qL − α)}
s.t.
(I) α+ (pH − y)qH − V (eH) ≥ RH
(II) α+ (pL − y)qL − V (eL) ≥ RL
(III) pH , eH = argmax α+ (pH − y)qH − V (eH)
(IV ) pL, eL = argmax α+ (pL − y)qL − V (eL)
(11)
Let
Vdp =
s20(θ
2
H − θ2L)[2b− (1− ρ)θ2H − ρθ2L]2
2(2b− θ2H)(2b− θ2L)[2b− (1− 2ρ)θ2H − 2ρθ2L]2
. (12)
Clearly, Vd1 < Vdp < Vd2. Solving problem Pdp, we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Except for Vdp < ∆R < Vd2 in which no equilibrium pooling contract exists, a unique
equilibrium pooling contract exists and the corresponding optimal decisions are given in Table 5.
From Propositions 4 and 5, we can conclude that when a separating equilibrium cannot be obtained
in the region Vd1 < ∆R < Vd2, the firm can offer an equilibrium pooling contract in a sub-region
Vd1 < ∆R ≤ Vdp. Different from the centralized pricing case, neither separating nor pooling equilibrium
contract exists in the remaining sub-region Vdp < ∆R < Vd2. Table 6 summarizes the firm’s optimal
equilibrium contract strategy under delegated pricing.
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Table 6: Optimal equilibrium contract strategy under delegated pricing
Region 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vd1 Vd1 < ∆R ≤ Vdp Vdp < ∆R < Vd2 ∆R ≥ Vd2
Contracts Separating Pooling No equilibrium Pooling
Table 7: Premiums and efforts compared with those in a homogeneous sales force
Region 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vd1 Vd1 < ∆R ≤ Vdp ∆R ≥ Vd2
PH Vd1 −∆R Vdp −∆R 0
PL 0 0 ∆R− Vd2
eH same lower same
eL lower lower same
Table 7 presents the agent premiums under price delegation. The results show that one agent
type, either the low or the high type, always exists with a zero premium. However, unlike centralized
pricing, the case when both agent types may receive a zero premium does not occur. Table 7 likewise
presents comparisons of efforts of the two agent types in a heterogeneous sales force with the effort in
a homogeneous sales force under price delegation. Recall that under centralized pricing, both agent
types may exert a higher level of effort than they would if they were from a homogeneous sales force.
However, this phenomenon would not occur under delegated pricing because of the assumption that
y ≥ 0. We summarize the above observations as well as those under centralized pricing in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, either agent type may receive zero premium and may exert the same
effort as though he were from a homogeneous sales force under both centralized and delegated pricing
schemes.
3.3 Comparisons of Centralized Pricing and Delegated Pricing
We compare the expected profits of the firm under the two pricing strategies. For the V thresholds,
we could easily verify that Vc2 < Vdp < Vd2 < Vc3. From Tables 3 and 6, we identify the firm’s optimal
pricing strategy and contract type, and illustrate them in Table 8. We use CS/CP and DS/DP as
the abbreviations for centralized pricing with separating/pooling contracts and delegated pricing with
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Table 8: The optimal pricing strategy and contract type
∆R [0, Vc1] (Vc1, Vc2) [Vc2, Vc3] (Vc3,∞)
If Vd1 ≤ Vc1 If C Holds
Optimal DP (Vc3, Vc4) [Vc4,∞)
Pricing If Vc1 < Vd1 ≤ Vc2 CP/DP CS
and CS (Vc1, Vd1] (Vd1, Vc2) CS Otherwise
Contract DS DP
Strategy If Vc2 < Vd1 CP/DP
DS
separating/pooling contracts, respectively.
Examining Table 8, we determine that the expected profit under delegated pooling is at least as
high as the profit from centralized pooling when equilibrium decisions are present under both pricing
strategies.
Observation 4 When equilibrium pooling contracts are offered under both pricing schemes, delegated
pricing performs as least as well as the centralized pricing for the firm.
When 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc2, both centralized pooling equilibrium and delegated pooling equilibrium
exist. With delegated pooling, the high-type agent would receive a higher premium than that with
centralized pooling. However, the expected social welfare generated by the two agent types under
delegated pooling is also higher than that under centralized pooling. The difference of social welfare
from the two pricing schemes is larger than the premium difference. Thus, delegated pooling is better
than centralized pooling for the firm.
When ∆R ≥ Vc3, the low-type agent receives a higher premium under delegated pooling than
under centralized pooling, and delegated pooling generates a higher social welfare than does centralized
pooling. However, the difference of social welfare from two pricing schemes is equal to the premium
difference. Thus, delegated and centralized pooling are equivalent for the firm.
Proposition 7. Centralized pricing is not always preferred over delegated pricing when the reservation
is type-dependent and the centralized equilibrium separating contracts do not exist.
When ∆R ∈ [0, Vc1], equilibrium contracts exist for centralized and delegated separating/pooling.
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The centralized separating contract brings the highest expected profit for the firm.
When ∆R ∈ (Vc1, Vc2), centralized and delegated pooling both have equilibriums and delegated
pooling performs better than centralized pooling. The equilibrium centralized separating contract does
not exist, whereas the equilibrium delegated separating contract depends on the Vd1 value. Thus, the
firm would select the price delegation scheme and offer separating (pooling) contracts if there is (is no)
equilibrium separating contract.
When ∆R ∈ [Vc2, Vc3], the centralized separating contract is the best choice for the firm, and there
is no information rent for either agent type.
When Condition C holds and ∆R ∈ (Vc3, Vc4), centralized separating equilibrium does not exist.
Pooling equilibrium exists under both pricing schemes, and the profits for the firm are identical. When
∆R ∈ [Vc4,∞), the firm would benefit from the separating contract with centralized pricing more than
the centralized or delegated pooling contract.
When condition C does not hold and ∆R ∈ (Vc3,∞), the firm offers a pooling contract in equilibrium
to both agent types under both pricing schemes.
Mishra and Prasad (2004) found that the expected profit from centralized separating is at least
as high, and may even be higher, as that from delegated separating. This finding is still true for our
model with type-dependent reservations. However, when the equilibrium centralized separating does
not exist, delegated pricing performs as least as well as centralized pricing under pooling contract.
Observation 5 Separating contract is always the first choice of the firm regardless of the pricing
scheme.
Our results also verify that screening agent is always better. For the firm, separating contracts
are always preferred over the corresponding pooling contracts. When the equilibrium exists under all
four strategies, the preference ranking for the firm from high to low is centralized separating, delegated
separating, delegated pooling, and centralized pooling.
4 Discussion
In this section, we examine two issues: the benefit of knowing the difference of reservations and whether
the key findings can be extended to models with multiple agent types.
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4.1 Benefit of Knowing the Difference of Reservations
We have shown in previous sections that type-dependent reservation affects contract design and agent
behaviors. Now, we examine the benefit of knowing the difference of reservations to the firm. Consider
the case (Situation 1) of centralized pricing with reservations RH and RL for the high type and the
low type, respectively. Suppose that the firm either does not know that the reservations differ or how
they differ, and simply assumes a common reservation R (Situation 2). Under centralized pricing, we
note from Table 1 that only the optimal payments tH and tL depends on the reservation. Thus, the
optimal decisions for Situation 2 are given by the second column of Table 1, except for
tRH = R+
s20θ
2
H
2(2b−θ2H)2
+ Vc1
tRL = R+
s20ψ
2θ2L
2(2b−ψθ2L)2
. (13)
We then examine the decisions and performance in Situation 2 and compare them with those in
Situation 1. Obviously, the assumed R must be at least as large as RL because otherwise, the IR
constraints would be violated in Situation 2.
For 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1, both agent types would choose the contracts for their types. The realized sales
and agent efforts would be the same in both situations. Without knowing RH and RL, the higher
compensations to the agent would reduce the expected profit of the firm.
For Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2, pooling contract is used in Situation 1. If RL ≤ R < RH − Vc1, the low-type
agent would accept {q∗L, t∗L} whereas the high-type agent will refuse {q∗H , t∗H} as his reservation is not
satisfied. If R ≥ RH −Vc1, both agent types would select the contracts for their types, and the realized
sales and efforts of the two types are higher than those in Situation 1. If
R ≤ RL + s
2
0bρ(θ
2
H − θ2L)2
(θ2H − ρθ2L)(2b− θ2H)(2b− θ2L)(2b− ψθ2L)
,
the profit of the firm would be higher than that in Situation 1. Otherwise, the profit of the firm would
be lower.
When Vc2 ≤ ∆R < Vc4 and Condition C holds. If RL ≤ R < RH − Vc1, the high type would
not accept contract {q∗H , t∗H}. If R ≥ RH − Vc1, both agent types would choose the contracts for their
types. The realized sales and efforts for the high type are the same, whereas those for the low type are
lower compared with those in Situation 1. Similarly, the profit of the firm is also lower.
When ∆R ≥ Vc4 and Condition C holds: Similarly, the high type would not accept the contract
if RL ≤ R < RH − Vc1. If R ≥ RH − Vc1, both types would accept the contracts for their types. The
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realized sales and efforts for both agent types are lower, and the profit of the firm is also lower than
that in Situation 1.
When ∆R ≥ Vc2 and Condition C does not hold: The comparisons for this case are the same as
the corresponding comparisons for the case when Vc2 ≤ ∆R < Vc4 and Condition C holds.
In summary, the firm benefits from knowing the two different reservations for most values of ∆R.
The firm may not benefit only when separating contracts do not exist in Situation 1 and the assumed
R is relatively low.
4.2 Generalization to N Types
In this subsection, we consider the compensation problem of a heterogenous sales force with N agent
types under centralized pricing. Our purpose is to examine whether the finding, Proposition 6, is
generally true. The equivalent principal-agent problem formulation is (for
∑
i ρi = 1, 0 < ρi < 1)
P0 : max
ti,qi,pi
∑
i
ρi(pi × qi − ti)
s.t.
(I) ti − V (eii) ≥ Ri for all i ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ]
(II) ti − V (eii) ≥ tj − V (eij) for all i, j ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ] and i 6= j
(III) eix = argmax tx − V (eix) for all i, x ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ]
. (14)
Here, (I) includes the individual rationality constraints, whereas (II) and (III) are the incentive
compatibility constraints.
The proof of Proposition 6’ follows directly from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 6 and
is outlined in the appendix.
Proposition 6’ Under the equilibrium centralized pricing contract, any of the N agent types may receive
zero premium and may exert the same effort as though they were members of a homogeneous sales force
depending on the reservation difference.
In contrast to the finding of Rao (1990), we determine that with type-dependent reservations,
paying information rent to all agent types, except the lowest type, in order to reveal the true types
of all agents is not always necessary. Paying no information rent to any agent type and determine
true agent types is possible. Furthermore, a contract may be designed to induce any agent type to
extend his/her best efforts. Under certain conditions, mobilizing all the agents in a heterogeneous sales
force to exert the same effort as though they were from a homogeneous sales force is possible without
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paying any information rent. All these imply that a heterogeneous sales force may work as well as a
homogeneous sales force for a firm.
5 Conclusion
In an early work on quota-based sales force compensation plan, Rao (1990) observed that only agents
with the highest ability in a heterogeneous sales force exert their best sales effort and that the firm that
employs a heterogeneous sales force has to pay information rents to all but the agent with the lowest
ability in the optimal compensation plan. This observation implies that as far as a firm is concerned,
a heterogeneous sales force does not work as well as a homogeneous sales force. In this paper, we
revisit the same problem but with type-dependent reservation. We also incorporate the issue of pricing
decision scheme in our model. By first using a model with two agent types and then considering N
agent types, we show results opposite to Rao: at least one agent type does not receive information
rent, whereas at least one agent type exerts the best sales effort under the optimal compensation plan.
Furthermore, retaining centralized pricing brings the benefit of a tool for regulating agent behavior.
Moreover, in some cases, designing a compensation plan under which a firm can learn the private
informationof agents without paying any information rent is possible, and motivate all agents to exert
their best efforts. Interestingly, when no agent receives a positive premium, all agents exert their best
sales efforts. This is an ideal situation for a firm and duplicates the performance of a homogeneous
sales force. We find that the outcomes depend on the interplay between agent reservation differences
and the cost differences for achieving quotas not intended for their own types. This finding under
scores the importance of a good understanding of the goals and effort costs of different agents when a
heterogeneous sales force is employed. Our findings also show that although simplifying analysis, the
commonly used assumption of identical reservation can lead to distorted conclusions.
We also find that screening the agents is always better for the firm, that is, separating contracts are
always preferred over the corresponding pooling contracts. Although centralized pricing is preferred
when separating contracts offered, delegated pricing provides greater benefits for the firm when only
pooling contracts are available.
We use discrete agent types in the model. When the agent type parameter is continuous as in Rao
(1990), we could still show that Rao’s observation on information rent and effort level is no longer true
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when reservation is type dependent.
We use a deterministic sales response function to refine the analysis. We believe that the general
conclusion would still hold under an uncertain sales response function. The analysis can be much more
complicated, but is worthy of further study.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We introduce the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian function of Pc as follows:
L(pH , qH , tH , pL, qL, tL) = ρ(pH × qH − tH) + (1− ρ)(pL × qL − tL)
−λ1[RH − (tH − V (eHH))]− λ2[RL − (tL − V (eLL))]
−λ3[tL − V (eHL)− (tH − V (eHH))]− λ4[tH − V (eLH)− (tL − V (eLL))],
where λi ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the Lagrangian multipliers. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KTC) are
∂L
∂qH
= 0, ∂L∂tH = 0,
∂L
∂qL
= 0, ∂L∂tL = 0,
λ1[RH − (tH − V (eHH)] = 0, λ2[RL − (tL − V (eLL))] = 0,
λ3[tL − V (eHL)− (tH − V (eHH))] = 0, and λ4[tH − V (eLH)− (tL − V (eLL))] = 0.
From ∂L/∂tH = −ρ+λ1+λ3−λ4 = 0 and ∂L/∂tL = −(1−ρ)+λ2−λ3+λ4 = 0, we have λ1+λ2 = 1.
Given that λ1 ≥ 0, we have either λ1 = 0 or λ1 > 0.
1) λ1 = 0. We have λ2 = 1; thus, Constraint (II) is binding. From ∂L/∂tH = 0, we have λ3 = λ4+ρ;
hence, λ3 > 0 and Constraint (III) is binding. Given that (III) is binding, Constraint (I) becomes
tL− V (eHL)) ≥ RH . With this inequality and (II) being binding, we conclude that for λ1 = 0 a Kuhn-
Tucker point (KTP) may be found if ∆R ≤ V (eLL)−V (eHL) = Vc1. Here, eLL and eHL are the efforts
needed by type L and type H to satisfy quota qL of the KTP ({pH , qH , tH , pL, qL, tL}) with λ1 = 0 and
λ2 = 1, provided that the KTP exists.
2) λ1 > 0. In this case, Constraint (I) is binding. For λ2, if λ2 > 0, Constraint (II) is binding. With
both (I) and (II) binding, Constraints (III) and (IV) become
RH ≥ RL + V (eLL)− V (eHL) and RL ≥ RH + V (eHH)− V (eLH),
respectively. By these two inequalities, a KTP can be be found when λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 if Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤
Vc3, where Vc2 = V (eLL) − V (eHL) and Vc3 = V (eLH) − V (eHH). Here, if a KTP exists when λ1 > 0
and λ2 > 0, eLL and eHL are the efforts needed for type L and type H to satisfy qL while eLH and eHH
are the efforts needed for type L and type H to satisfy qH of the KTP.
If λ2 = 0, we have from ∂L/∂tL = 0, λ4 = λ3 + 1 − ρ; hence, λ4 > 0 and Constraint (IV) is
binding. Given that (IV) is binding, Constraint (II) can be rewritten as tH − V (eLH) ≥ RL. With
this inequality and Constraint (I) binding, a K-T point can be found with λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0 if
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∆R ≥ V (eLH) − V (eHH) = Vc4. Here, eLH and eHH are the efforts needed for type L and type H to
satisfy the qH in the KTP when λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0.
To summarize, there are three possible KTPs, corresponding to the following three cases: (1) λ1 =
0, λ2 = 1, λ3 > 0, λ4 ≥ 0; (2) λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λ4 ≥ 0; and (3) λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0, λ3 ≥ 0,
λ4 > 0.
First solving Pc in case (1) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1, λ3 > 0, λ4 ≥ 0 (where 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1). Pc can be
simplified as P1.
P1 : max
pH,qH,tH,pL,qL,tL
{ρ(pH × qH − tH) + (1− ρ)(pL × qL − tL)}
s.t.

tL − V (eLL) = RL
tH − V (eHH) = tL − V (eHL)
tL − V (eLL) ≥ tH − V (eLH)
We need to consider two cases for P1: λ4 > 0 and λ4 = 0.
1) For λ4 > 0, Constraint (IV) becomes
(A1) tL − V (eLL) = tH − V (eLH),
by which Constraint tH − V (eHH) = tL − V (eHL) in P1 can be rewritten to V (eHH) + V (eLL) =
V (eLH) + V (eHL). By demand response function s = s0 + θe − bp and assumption V (e) = e2/2, we
have
1
2
(
qH − s0 + bpH
θH
)2 +
1
2
(
qL − s0 + bpL
θL
)2 =
1
2
(
qH − s0 + bpH
θL
)2 +
1
2
(
qL − s0 + bpL
θH
)2,
leading to qL + bpL = qH + bpH and tL = tH .
With all three constraints in P1 binding, it is optimal for the firm to offer the same quotas and
payments to the two types of agents. Replacing pH , qH and tH by pL, qL and tL, respectively, in the
objective function of P1, and further replacing tL by V (eLL) +RL according to (A1), P1 is reduced to
(A2) P1(1) : max
pL,qL
{pL × qL − V (eLL)−RL}.
Applying demand response function (1) and assumption (2) again, (A2) becomes
P1(1) : max
pL,qL
pif (pL, qL) = pL × qL − 12(
qL − s0 + bpL
θL
)2 −RL.
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The Hessian matrix of pif (pL, qL) is negative definite everywhere. We obtain p∗L1(1) = p
∗
H1(1), q
∗
L1(1) =
q∗H1(1) from the first-order conditions of pif (pL, qL):
p∗L1(1) =
s0
2b− θ2L
, q∗L1(1) =
bs0
2b− θ2L
Under this quota, type H and type L exert the following efforts
e∗HH1(1) =
θL
θH
s0θL
2b− θ2L
, e∗LL1(1) =
s0θL
2b− θ2L
and the optimal payments are t∗L1(1) = t
∗
H1(1) = RL+
1
2e
∗2
LL1(1) . Then, {p∗i1(1), q∗i1(1), t∗i1(1)} (i = H,L)
is a KTP.
2) For λ4 = 0, Constraint (IV) is slack and can be eliminated. P1 now becomes
P1(2) : max
pH,qH,tH,pL,qL,tL
{ρ(pH × qH − tH) + (1− ρ)(pL × qL − tL)}
s.t.
 tL − V (eLL) = RLtH − V (eHH) = tL − V (eHL) .
Substituting the two binding constraints into the objective function, P1(2) becomes
P1(2) : max
pH,qH,pL,qL
{ρ(pH×qH−(V (eLL)+V (eHH)−V (eHL)+RL))+(1−ρ)(pL×qL−(V (eLL)+RL))}
without any constraints. Again, we can write P1(2) : maxpH,qH,pL,qL pif (pH , qH , pL, qL) where
pif (pH , qH , pL, qL) = ρ[pH × qH − 12 [( qL−s0+bpLθL )2 + (
qH−s0+bpH
θH
)2 − ( qL−s0+bpLθH )2]]
+ (1− ρ)[pL × qL − 12( qL−s0+bpLθL )2]−RL.
The Hessian matrix of pif (pH , qH , pL, qL) is negative definite everywhere. We obtain p∗H1(2), q
∗
H1(2)
and p∗L1(2), q
∗
L1(2) from the first-order conditions,
(A3)

p∗H1(2) =
s0
2b−θ2H
, q∗H1(2) =
bs0
2b−θ2H
p∗L1(2) =
s0
2b−ψθ2L
, q∗L1(2) =
bs0
2b−ψθ2L
where ψ1 = 1−ρ1−ρ/r2 . The optimal efforts for the two agents are
e∗HH1(2) =
s0θH
2b− θ2H
, e∗LL1(2) =
s0ψ1θL
2b− ψ1θ2L
The optimal payments are t∗H1(2) =
1
2(e
∗
HH1(2))
2 + (1− 1
r2
)12(e
∗
LL1(2))
2 +RL
t∗L1(2) =
1
2(e
∗
LL1(2))
2 +RL
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{p∗i1(2), q∗i1(2), t∗i1(2)}(i = H,L) is another KTP for P1. Comparing the profits of the firm at the
two KTPs, we find
pif (p∗i1(1), q
∗
i1(1), t
∗
i1(1)) < pif (p
∗
i1(2), q
∗
i1(2), t
∗
i1(2)) (i = H,L).
In other words, the KTP given by (A3) should be kept for P1. Because eHL = qL+bpL−s0θH , taking
the value of q∗L1(2) in P1 ’s optimal solution, we have Vc1 =
1
2(1− 1r2 )(e∗LL1(2))2.
We still need to justify whether KTP {p∗i1(2), q∗i1(2), t∗i1(2)} (i = H,L) is the global maximum point
of Pc when 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1. We use the theorem of KKT Second-order Sufficient Conditions.
Rearranging Constraints (II) and (III) in Pc, we have
h1(pH , qH , tH , pH , qL, tL) = RL − tL + (qL−s0+bpL)
2
2θ2L
≤ 0
h2(pH , qH , tH , pH , qL, tL) = tL − (qL−s0+bpL)
2
2θ2H
− tH + (qH−s0+bpH)
2
2θ2H
≤ 0
.
Notice that constraints (II) and (III) are binding at the KTP for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1. We can obtain the
gradients of hi(, ) (i = 1, 2) at the KTP:
∇h1(, )t = (0, 0, 0, bs0ψ12b−ψ1θ2L ,
s0ψ1
2b−ψ1θ2L
,−1)
∇h2(, )t = ( bs02b−θ2H ,
s0
2b−θ2H
,−1,− bs0ψ1
r2(2b−ψ1θ2L)
,− s0ψ1
r2(2b−ψ1θ2L)
, 1)
.
Define the cone C = {d 6= 0 : ∇h1(, )td = 0 and ∇h2(, )td = 0}. Then vector d is given by∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x1
x2
(bx1 + x2) s02b−θ2H
+ (bx3 + x4)(1− 1r2 ) s0ψ12b−ψ1θ2L
x3
x4
(bx3 + x4) s0ψ12b−ψ1θ2L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
where xi²R, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and not every xi can be zero at the same time. The Hessian of the Lagrangian
function L(pH , qH , tH , pL, qL, tL) at the KTP is
∇2L(, ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−ρb2
θ2H
ρ(1− b
θ2H
) 0 0 0 0
ρ(1− b
θ2H
) − ρ
θ2H
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 b2( ρ
θ2H
− 1
θ2L
) 1− ρ+ b( ρ
θ2H
− 1
θ2L
) 0
0 0 0 1− ρ+ b( ρ
θ2H
− 1
θ2L
) ρ
θ2H
− 1
θ2L
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
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We have dt∇2L(p∗i1(2), q∗i1(2), t∗i1(2))d < 0 (i = H,L). Thus, KTP {p∗i1(2), q∗i1(2), t∗i1(2)}, (i = H,L)
is the strict local maximum for P when 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1. Because Pc is continuous in the six variables,
{p∗i1(2), q∗i1(2), t∗i1(2)}, (i = H,L) must be the global maximum of Pc for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1.
The solution procedures for the other two cases are completely parallel and are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2: We introduce the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian function of Pcp as follows:
L(p, q, t) = p× q − t− λ1(RH − (t− V (eH)))− λ2(RL − (t− V (eL)))
where λi ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2 are the Lagrangian multipliers. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KTC) are
∂L
∂p = 0,
∂L
∂t = 0,
∂L
∂q = 0
λ1[RH − (t− V (eH)] = 0, λ2[RL − (t− V (eL))] = 0
From ∂L∂t = −1 + λ1 + λ2 = 0, we have λ1 + λ2 = 1. Given λ1 ≥ 0, we have λ1 = 0 or λ1 > 0.
1) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1; thus, Constraint t − V (eL) ≥ RL is binding. Constraint t − V (eH) ≥ RH
becomes V (eL) − V (eH) ≥ RH − RL. So we conclude that for λ1 = 0, a KPT may be found if
∆R ≤ V (eL)− V (eH). In this case, Pcp becomes,
Pcp(1) : max
p,q
pif (p, q) = p× q − 12(
q − s0 + bp
θL
)2 −RL.
The Hessian matrix of pif (p, q) is negative definite everywhere. We obtain the optimal p and q from
the first-order conditions and V (eL)− V (eH) = Vc2.
2) λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0; Case 2) is similar to Case 1). We just need to interchange ”H” and ”L”. The
KPT may be found if ∆R ≥ V (eL)− V (eH).
Pcp(2) : max
p,q
pif (p, q) = p× q − 12(
q − s0 + bp
θH
)2 −RH .
The optimal p and q can be get from the FOCs and V (eL)− V (eH) = Vc3 in this case.
3) λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0; thus, two constrains will be binding, which leads to RH −RL = V (eL)−V (eH).
So Case 3) will be at the endpoint of Case 1) or at the initial point of Case 2) for different ∆R.
The proofs of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 are similar to that of Proposition 1 and Proposition
2 and are omitted.
Proof of Premiums in Table 3: We show the conclusions in five cases according to the value of
∆R.
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1) When 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1, type H and type L agents choose contracts {p∗H1, q∗H1, t∗H1} and {p∗L1, q∗L1, t∗L1}
(second column of Table 1) in equilibrium, respectively. The premiums they receive are PH(q∗H1) =
t∗H1 − V (e∗HH1)−RH = Vc1 −∆R ≥ 0 and PL(q∗L1) = t∗L1 − V (e∗LL1)−RL = 0.
2) When Vc1 < ∆R < Vc2, type H and type L agents will accept the only contract {p∗L, q∗L, t∗L} in
equilibrium (second column of Table 2). Their premiums are PH(q∗L) = Vc2 −∆R and PL(q∗L) = 0.
3)When Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3, type H and type L agents choose contracts {p∗H2, q∗H2, t∗H2} and {p∗L2, q∗L2, t∗L2}
in equilibrium(third column of Table 1), respectively. Their premiums are PH(q∗H2) = 0 and PL(q
∗
L2) =
0.
4) When Vc3 < ∆R < Vc4, type H and type L agents will accept the only contract {p∗H , q∗H , t∗H} in
equilibrium (third column of Table 2). Their premiums are PH(q∗L) = 0 and PL(q
∗
L) = ∆R− Vc3.
5)When Vc4 ≤ ∆R, if condition C holds, type H and type L agents choose contracts {p∗H3, q∗H3, t∗H3} and
{p∗L3, q∗L3, t∗L3} (fourth column of Table 1) in equilibrium, respectively. Their premiums are PH(q∗H3) = 0
and PL(q∗L3) = ∆R − Vc4 ≥ 0. If condition C is not satisfied, the two agent types receive the same
premium as given in (4).
Proof of Observation 1: The observation can be drawn directly from Proposition 1. If condition
C holds, for 0 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc1, Vc2 ≤ ∆R ≤ Vc3, and Vc4 ≤ ∆R, we have p∗H , q∗H and p∗L, q∗L from the
following equations, respectively:
p∗H1 =
s0
2b−θ2H
, q∗H1 =
bs0
2b−θ2H
p∗L1 =
s0
2b−ψ1θ2L
, q∗L1 =
bs0
2b−ψ1θ2L
p∗H2 =
s0
2b−θ2H
, q∗H2 =
bs0
2b−θ2H
p∗L2 =
s0
2b−θ2L
, q∗L2 =
bs0
2b−θ2L
p∗H3 =
s0
2b−ψ2θ2H
, q∗H3 =
bs0
2b−ψ2θ2H
p∗L3 =
s0
2b−θ2L
, q∗L3 =
bs0
2b−θ2L
Given that
ψ1 =
1− ρ
1− ρ/r2 < 1 and ψ2 =
ρ
1− (1− ρ)r2 > 1,
we have p∗H > p
∗
L, q
∗
H > q
∗
L for all three cases. The cost difference required for type H and type L
agents to achieve q∗H is
V (e∗LH)− V (e∗HH) =
1
2
(q∗H − s0 + bp∗H)2(
1
θ2L
− 1
θ2H
).
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The cost difference required for type H and type L agents to achieve q∗L is
V (e∗LL)− V (e∗HL) =
1
2
(q∗L − s0 + bp∗L)2(
1
θ2L
− 1
θ2H
).
Given that p∗H > p
∗
L and q
∗
H > q
∗
L, we have V (e
∗
LH)− V (e∗HH) > V (e∗LL)− V (e∗HL).
Proof of Proposition 6: We only need to show the optimal effort of an agent in a homogeneous sales
force. For this, we solve the following problem:
max
p,q,t
{p× q − t}
s.t. t− 1
2
(
q − s0 + bp
θ
)2 ≥ R.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that p∗ = s0
2b−θ2 and q
∗ = bs0
2b−θ2 The optimal effort
the agent has to exert to achieve quota q∗ is e∗ = s0θ
2b−θ2 . The optimal payment is t
∗ = 12e
∗2 +R.
Proof of Proposition 6’:
The firm needs to solve the optimization problem P0 with N2 constraints. We introduce the
Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian function for Problem P0:
L(pi, qi, ti) =
∑
i
ρi(pi × qi − ti)
−
∑
i
λii[Ri − (ti − V (eii))]
−
∑
i
∑
j
λij [tj − V (eij)− (ti − V (eii))]
where λii ≥ 0, λij ≥ 0, i, j ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ] and i 6= j, λii,λij are the Lagrangian multipliers.

∂L
∂pi
= 0, ∂L∂qi = 0,
∂L
∂ti
= 0
λii[Ri − (ti − V (eii))] = 0, λij [tj − V (eij)− (ti − V (eii))] = 0
.
From
∂L
∂ti
= −ρi + λii +
∑
j
(λij − λji) = 0 for all i 6= j
we have
∑
i λii = 1. Because λii ≥ 0, the KTCs require λii = 0 or λii > 0. λii is the Lagrangian
multiplier for type i’s IR constraint. Thus, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, any λii could be Zero,
but could not all be Zero at the same time. At least one λii must be positive, and any λii could be
33
HKIBS/WPS/069-1314
positive. Further, all λii could be positive at the same time. With these properties, we can conclude
that any type agent’s IR could be binding and thus any type can get Zero premium. Following the
analysis of Proof for Proposition 1, we have Proposition 6’.
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